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Abstract:  Infinitists  argue  that  their  view  outshines 
foundationalism because infinitism can, whereas founda-
tionalism cannot, explain two of epistemic justification’s 
crucial features: it comes in degrees and it can be com-
plete. I present four different ways that foundationalists 
could make sense of those two features of justification, 
thereby undermining the case for infinitism.
1. Introduction
We find two main contemporary arguments for the infinitist theory 
of epistemic justification (‘infinitism’ for short):  the regress argu-
ment (Klein 1999, 2005) and the features argument (Fantl 2003). 
I’ve addressed the former elsewhere (Turri 2009a). Here I address 
the latter.
Jeremy Fantl  argues that  infinitism outshines foundationalism 
because infinitism alone can explain two of epistemic justification’s 
crucial features, namely, that it  comes in degrees and  can be com-
plete.  This paper demonstrates foundationalism’s ample resources 
for explaining both features.
Section 2 clarifies the debate’s key terms. Section 3 recounts how 
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infinitism explains  the  two crucial  features.  Section 4 presents 
Fantl’s  argument  that  foundationalism cannot  explain  the  two 
crucial features. Section 5 explains how foundationalism can ex-
plain the two crucial features. Section 6 sums up.
2. Terms and Requirements
Infinitism is the view that a proposition Q is epistemically jus-
tified for you just  in case there is  available to  you an infinite 
series  of  non-repeating reasons  that  favors  believing Q (Fantl 
2003, 539).1 Foundationalism is the view that Q is epistemic-
ally justified for you just in case you have a series of non-repeat-
ing reasons that favors believing Q, terminating in a properly ba-
sic foundational reason “that needs no further reason.”2
I cannot here fully characterize epistemic justification, partly 
because doing so would beg important questions in the present 
context, but I may say this much. Epistemic justification is the 
positive normative status needed for knowledge, closely associ-
ated with having evidence in favor of the truth of some claim, and 
typically contrasted with the practical justification, whether moral 
1 Fantl (2003, 539 – 540) indicates that he is concerned with  pro-
positional,  rather  than  doxastic,  justification.  The  latter  requires 
that the belief be properly held on the basis of the good reasons 
you possess; the former does not.  Stated more fully, the infinitist 
theory of propositional justification is: The proposition Q is proposi-
tionally justified for S just in case there is available to S at least one 
infinite series of  propositions (or reasons) such that R1 is  a good 
(and undefeated)  reason to believe Q,  R2 is  a  good (and un-
defeated) reason to believe R1, R3 is a good (and undefeated) 
reason to believe R2, …,  Rm + 1 is a good (and undefeated) reason 
to believe Rm, for an arbitrarily high m. See Turri 2009b.
2 I doubt that this fully satisfactorily characterizes foundationalism, 
but I won’t stop to argue the point here. It isn’t fully satisfactory 
because foundationalism needn’t require that the chain of reas-
ons terminate. See Turri 2009a, 162 – 3.
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or prudential, involved in action.3 I shall refer to it simply as ‘jus-
tification’.
Doubtless justification comes in degrees. You can obviously be 
more or less justified in accepting some claim.  An adequate the-
ory of justification must respect this, and “explain why or show 
how” justification comes in  degrees.  Call  this  the degree re-
quirement.
Complete justification is “justification for which there is no 
higher degree” (Fantl 2003, 538), or otherwise put, “that degree 
of  justification  that  cannot  be  increased  further”  (Fantl  2003, 
547). This contrasts with  adequate justification, which is the 
minimal degree of justification required for knowledge. It is not 
plausible to identify adequate justification with complete justifica-
tion. That justification can be complete is less obvious than that it 
comes in degrees. For the sake of argument, I grant that justifica-
tion can be complete. As such, an adequate theory of justification 
must likewise explain why or show how justification can be com-
plete. Call this the completeness requirement.
3. How Infinitism Proposes to Meet the 
Requirements
Infinitists  satisfy  the degree  requirement by pointing out that 
length  comes in  degrees,  which  justification may  mirror.  “All 
else being equal, the longer your series of reasons for a proposi-
tion, the more justified it is for you” (Fantl 2003, 554).
Fantl offers the following analysis of complete justification: Q 
is completely justified for you just in case you have an infinite ar-
ray of adequate reasons for Q (Fantl 2003, 558). Having an infin-
3 Though see Fantl and McGrath 2002 and 2007 for more on the 
complex relationship between epistemic and practical matters.
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ite array involves infinitely more than merely having an infinite 
series. To have an infinite array of reasons favoring Q, for each 
potential challenge to Q, or to any of the infinite reasons in the 
chain supporting Q, or to any of the inferences involved in tra-
versing any link in the chain, you must have available a further in-
finite series of reasons. In a word, it requires having an infinite 
number of infinite chains.
This analysis of complete justification ensures that no proposi-
tion is ever completely justified for any of us. Fantl does not view 
this as a problem, because he intuits that although many proposi-
tions are adequately justified for us, none is completely justified.
There is an alternative view, however. It seems that we are jus-
tified in being absolutely certain of some claims. For example, I 
know for absolute certain that I exist, and that something exists. 
Furthermore, it is natural to suppose that we are completely justi-
fied when we know for absolute certain. So at least some claims 
would seem to be completely justified for us. If correct, this con-
founds Fantl’s infinitist analysis of complete justification. How-
ever, the following discussion does not presuppose that it is cor-
rect.
4. How Foundationalism Supposedly Fails to Meet 
the Requirements
Foundationalists  divide  over  how  to  understand  foundational 
reasons.  Traditional foundationalists contend that founda-
tional reasons are “self-justifying” because their mere truth suf-
fices to justify them. The claims <I am thinking> and <There is 
at  least  one  proposition  that  is  not  both  true  and  false>  are 
plausible candidates for self-justifying reasons. Metajustificat-
ory foundationalists deny that the mere truth of a founda-
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tional reason ensures its foundational status. Instead, they say, 
foundational reasons must have property F. Different theorists 
adopt different values for ‘F’. Some say it is ‘is reliably caused’, 
others say it is ‘coheres with the subjects other beliefs’,  others 
say it is ‘is clearly and distinctly perceived’, and yet others might 
say it is ‘is approved by society’ or ‘is approved by God’. Other 
values are possible. Importantly, metajustificatory foundational-
ism “cannot require that a believer have access to the metajusti-
ficatory feature as a reason for the foundational reason,” because 
that would rob the putative foundational reason of its status as 
foundational  (Fantl  2003,  541).  It  would effectively  require  a 
further reason for the reason that supposedly stood in no need of 
it.
Fantl’s division may not capture every important distinction 
among varieties of  foundationalism. But it does divide all founda-
tionalists into two neat groups, and this suffices for his purposes. 
We may represent his basic argument as follows:
1. All  foundationalist  theories  are  either  traditional  or 
metajustificatory.4 (Premise)
2. Traditional foundationalism cannot satisfy the degree 
requirement. (Premise)
3. Metajustificatory  foundationalism  cannot  satisfy  the 
completeness requirement. (Premise)
4. Therefore no foundationalist theory can satisfy both the 
degree and completeness requirements. (From 1 – 3)
5. An adequate theory of  justification must satisfy  both 
the degree and completeness requirements. (Premise)
6. Therefore no foundationalist theory of justification is 
adequate. (From 4 – 5)
The argument is valid, so it remains to ask whether the premises 
4 The ‘or’ here should be understood exclusively.
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are true. I am granting premises 1 and 5 for the sake of argu-
ment. This leaves 2 and 3. The remainder of this section presents 
Fantl’s case for each.
We begin with Fantl’s case for 2, i.e. against traditional found-
ationalism. Traditional foundationalism has insufficient resources 
to satisfy the degree requirement. All self-justifying reasons are by 
definition true, and their truth justifies them. Yet “truth  per se 
cannot determine which self-justifying reasons are more or less 
self-justifying” (Fantl 2003, 544). Appealing to properties other 
than the truth of foundational beliefs is inconsistent with tradi-
tional  foundationalism; it  would  effectively  transform it  into  a 
form of metajustificatory foundationalism. So truth alone won’t 
suffice, and no other property is eligible. Traditional foundation-
alism cannot satisfy the degree requirement.
We now move on to Fantl’s case for 3, i.e. against metajustific-
atory foundationalism. To satisfy the completeness requirement, 
the metajustificatory foundationalist will have to say something 
like this:
Q is completely justified for you iff you have 
a  non-repeating  series  of  reasons  for  Q, 
ultimately  founded  on  a  reason  that 
exemplifies the metajustificatory feature [F] 
to the highest possible degree. (Fantl 2003, 
546)
But the proposal fails. No matter what value ‘F’ takes, if you gain 
a reason to think that the foundational reason completely exem-
plifies  F,  and  that  exemplifying  F  is  epistemically  important, 
then Q will thereby become better justified for you. Consider, for 
example, a reliabilist version of metajustificatory foundational-
ism, which says that Q is completely justified for you just in case 
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you  have  a  non-repeating  series  of  reasons  for  Q,  ultimately 
founded on a 100% reliable reason. If you gain a reason to be-
lieve that your foundational reason was 100% reliably caused, 
and  that  reliability  is  epistemically  important,  then  Q  will 
thereby become better justified for you.5 But then metajustificat-
ory foundationalism has not satisfied the completeness require-
ment, for it will be possible to increase your justification for Q 
beyond what maximal exemplification of F would allow.
5. Foundationalist Solutions
I begin by responding to 2. The simplest response is to endorse 
the view, familiar from fuzzy logic, that truth comes in degrees 
(see Priest 2001, chapter 11). On this view, we may represent a 
proposition’s degree of truth by assigning it a real number in the 
interval between 0 and 1, inclusive (represented by ‘[0, 1]’). The 
degree of justification could then covary with the foundational 
reason’s  degree  of  truth.  Complete  justification  would corres-
pond to  a  foundational  reason true  to  degree  1.  A traditional 
foundationalist may, if she likes, treat 1 as an ideal limit that is 
never actually reached.
A second response suggests itself. Retain a standard non-de-
greed theory of truth.  A foundational  reason’s truth suffices to 
render it  adequately justified for you; it  is  in this sense that a 
foundational reason’s truth suffices to justify it. However, any de-
gree of justification beyond adequate requires that you be aware 
of the foundational reason’s truth. Awareness comes in degrees. 
5 Fantl  (2003,  540  n.7)  says  that  reasons  are  propositions.  Yet  it 
makes  no  sense  to  talk  about  a  proposition  being  reliably 
caused. We must, I  believe, understand this to mean a reliably 
caused token belief state, which takes the foundational proposi-
tion as its object.
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Complete justification requires perfect awareness of the founda-
tional reason’s truth. Should we desire, we may represent the de-
gree of awareness by assigning it a real number in the interval [0, 
1]. Again, the traditional foundationalist may treat perfect aware-
ness as an ideal limit that is never actually reached.
I shall now respond to 3. One response is to adopt a two-di-
mensional model of belief. The first dimension is  credence, or 
how strongly you believe. Credence comes in degrees, which we 
may represent by real numbers in the interval [0, 1]. 1 represents 
full belief, 0 full disbelief, and .5 perfect suspension of judgment. 
The second dimension is fixation. At any point in time, you can 
be  more or  less  fixated on a certain degree of  credence,  i.e.  it 
could more or less easily turn out that your credence shifts from 
where it is to some other point in the interval. Fixation likewise 
comes in degrees, which we may also represent by real numbers 
in  the  interval  [0,  1],  with  0  indicating the  maximum level  of 
volatility consistent with the state in question being a belief, and 1 
the maximum level of imperviousness to change consistent with 
the state in question being a belief. We can plot these two dimen-
sions on a graph, the y-axis representing credence and the x-axis 
representing fixation.
With this framework in place, a metajustificatory foundation-
alist could say that having a non-repeating series of reasons for Q, 
ultimately founded on a reason that fully exemplifies the metajus-
tificatory property F, justifies full belief in Q. That is, it justifies 
you in being here (represented by the star) on your belief-graph 
for Q:
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Gaining a reason to believe the proposition <Full belief in Q is 
justified for me> increases the degree to which you are justified 
in being fixated in your full belief in Q. In other words, it justifies 
for you a greater degree of fixation, moving you further to the 
right along the x-axis.
Gaining a further reason to believe the proposition <Full belief 
in <full belief in Q is justified for me> is justified for me> justi-
fies an even greater degree of fixation in your full  belief in Q. 
Further iterations at higher levels are handled similarly. There is 
no limit in principle to the number of levels.
We are now positioned to offer the metajustificatory founda-
tionalist proposal:
Q is completely justified for you just in case 
you are justified in being maximally fixated 
10
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at full belief in Q.
The metajustificatory foundationalist may treat maximal fixation 
as the ideal limit, which can be approached to varying degrees 
but never actually reached.
A second response suggests itself.  Set aside the two-dimen-
sional model of belief, and adopt instead a qualitative common-
sense framework for measuring strength of belief, with full belief 
being the strongest. Q is adequately justified for you when full be-
lief  in  Q  is  justified.  Adequate  justification  could  be  overde-
termined. That is, you could have more than one reason, or chain 
of reasons, in virtue of which Q is adequately justified for you. 
One such reason could be the proposition <Full belief in Q is jus-
tified for me>.6 There is no limit in principle to the degree of over-
determination. Having recognized all  this,  the metajustificatory 
foundationalist could propose:
Q is completely justified for you just in case 
it  is  infinitely  overdetermined  that  full 
belief in Q is justified for you.7
6 Here I rely on a principle that Fantl (2003: 549) himself relies on 
when  arguing  against  metajustificatory  foundationalism:  “Your 
epistemic position can be improved in one of two ways: 1) the 
degree to which p is justified for you can increase and 2) the de-
gree to which it is justified for you that p is justified for you can in-
crease.”
7 Note  that  accepting  this  doesn’t  require  the  metajustificatory 
foundationalist to reject the earlier claim, “if you gain a reason to 
think that the foundational reason completely exemplifies F, and 
that exemplifying F is epistemically important, then Q will thereby 
become better justified for you.” For we can understand ‘better 
justified’ to include not only an increase in the degree of justifica-
tion, but an increase in the security or stability of the degree of 
justification, which overdetermination promotes. This remains true 
whether  justification  is  determined  by  reliability  or  any  other 
plausible  candidate  the  metajustificatory  foundationalist  sug-
gests.
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6. Conclusion
That  brings  my discussion  to  a  close.  We have  seen  four  re-
sponses to Fantl’s argument, two on behalf of both the tradition-
al  foundationalist  and  the  metajustificatory  foundationalist.  If 
any of the four works, then foundationalism can indeed satisfy 
the twin requirements of degree and completeness, thereby un-
dermining Fantl’s case for infinitism.
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